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The Protection of Religious Freedom by the National 
Constitution and by Human Rights Treaties in the 
Republic of Argentina1 
Octavio Lo Prete 
I. RELIGION IN ARGENTINE SOCIETY 
Argentina is a religious society with long-held faith in God. This 
religious tradition has been a characteristic of the Argentine people 
since the beginning. To this day, nearly two hundred years after the 
start of Argentina’s march toward independence, religion continues 
to be a crucial part of Argentine life.  
A recent study by an accredited scientific organization and 
several of the nation’s leading universities is quite revealing on this 
matter.2 According to the study, 91.1% of those surveyed said they 
“believe in God,”3 and they defined their religious affiliations as 
follows: Catholic (76.5%), Evangelical (9%),4 Jehovah’s Witness 
 
 1. Work presented at the Fifteenth Annual International Law & Religion Symposium, 
hosted by the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, USA; 
the theme for the symposium was “International Protection of Religious Freedom: National 
Implementation.” 
  Founder and former Secretary of the Consejo Argentino para la Libertad Religiosa 
(CALIR) [Argentine Council for Religious Liberty] and the Instituto de Derecho Eclesiástico 
[Institute of Ecclesiastical Law] at the Catholic University of Argentina. Professor Lo Prete is 
also a professor on the Faculties of Law at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) and the 
Catholic University of Argentina (UCA). 
 2. CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS E INVESTIGACIONES LABORALES (CEIL) OF THE CONSEJO 
NACIONAL DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTÍFICAS Y TÉCNICAS (CONICET), PRIMERA 
ENCUESTA SOBRE CREENCIAS Y ACTITUDES RELIGIOSAS EN ARGENTINA (2008), available at 
http://www.culto.gov.ar/encuestareligion.pdf. The University of Buenos Aires, the National 
University—Rosario, the National University—Cuyo, and the National University—Santiago 
del Estero also participated in the study. The national study included 2403 cases, with a 
margin of error of +/- 2% and a 95% confidence level. The survey results were presented on 
August 26, 2008, in the Argentine Chancellery (Ministry of Foreign Relations, International 
Commerce, and Religion). It must be noted that the last national census which included 
information on the religious identities of the Argentine population was taken in 1960. 
 3. Id. at 4. In the survey, 4.9% responded “no,” meaning that the individual surveyed 
did not believe in God, and 4.0% said that they “doubt” or “sometimes believe.” Id. 
 4. In the survey, 7.9% of those listed as “Evangelical” were defined as “Pentecostal” 
and the rest as Baptist, Lutheran, Adventist, or belonging to the “Iglesia Universal del Reino de 
Dios” (IURD) [Universal Kingdom of God Church]. Id. at 6. 
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(1.2%), Mormon (0.9%), and other religions (1.2%). The remaining 
11.3% of respondents claimed to be “indifferent.”5 
Despite evidence of the advance of a worldwide culture 
encouraging the exclusion of religion from society, or in other 
words, one that objects to the public presence of anything related to 
a belief in a faith, this study reveals that Argentina remains a religious 
society that believes in God.6 The data also support the idea that 
Argentina is dominated by a Christian culture, with Jesus at the top 
of the “ranking” of beliefs.7 That is, 91.8% of those surveyed claim to 
believe “much or somewhat” in Jesus Christ, with 84.8% believing in 
the Holy Ghost, 80.1% in the Virgin Mary, 78.2% believing in 
angels, 76.2% believing in Saints, and 64.5% believing in energy.8 
However, we must note that the survey also reveals the existence 
of a complex process of religious deinstitutionalization. This is 
confirmed by the fact that more than half of the population says that 
they relate to God “without intermediaries,” and also by the fact that 
a large majority of the population exhibits a certain discrepancy 
between their own conscience and the official doctrine upheld by the 
religion to which they claim to belong—especially when it comes to 
controversial topics such as abortion, sex education in schools, the 
use of contraceptives, and women in the priesthood.9 This religious 
deinstitutionalization was highlighted by responses concerning 
attendance at religious ceremonies. Of the respondents, 76% 
reported that they either “seldom” or “never” visit places of worship, 
while only 23.8% said they attend “very frequently.”10 
Thus, it is clear that matters of religion can present us with a 
complex phenomenon; for example, a person may define him or 
herself as belonging to a particular organized religion and say that he 
or she frequently attends places of worship, but at the same time 
chooses to relate to God “on his or her own terms,” and, on certain 
topics, he or she may believe in his or her own conscience and make 
decisions contrary to the postulated doctrines of his or her church or 
religious community. Such a person might explain it as such: “I 
 
 5. Those placed in the “indifferent” category include agnostics, atheists, and those who 
do not belong to an organized religion. Id. at 6. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. at 10. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 16. 
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belong to a religion and attend worship services, but I go when I 
want to, and there are some teachings of my religion that I do not 
adhere to.” In short, individuals such as this live their religion “in 
their own way.” 
Finally, the study concludes with the topic of “public confidence 
in institutions.” This is an especially important topic in a country like 
Argentina, where the credibility of these institutions, particularly 
those in the political sphere, has been weak for many decades. In 
general, all of the percentages were low, but it was a religious 
institution—the Catholic Church—that had the highest rated 
confidence level of those surveyed (59%).11 The remainder of the 
institutions on the survey were ranked as follows: media (58%), 
Armed Forces (46%), police (42%), legal system (40%), Evangelical 
churches (39%), Congress (36%), unions (30%), and lastly, political 
parties (27%).12 
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
The Constitution of Argentina was first adopted in the year 
1853.13 Consistent with Argentina’s religious tradition, this 
“theistic” constitution invokes the name of God in its preamble.14 
The Constitution’s text also recognizes God’s exclusive dominion 
over those private actions of men which in no way offend public 
order or morality, nor injure a third party.15 Juan Bautista Alberdi, 
the Argentine political theorist whose writings inspired the creators 
of the 1853 Constitution, wrote that the invocation of God in the 
preamble must be made “not in a mystical sense, but rather in a 
profound political sense.”16 A noted modern author, Alfonso 
Santiago, explained that this invocation of God “marks the clear 
adherence of our Constitution to a theistic and iusnaturalist [natural 
 
 11. Id. at 28. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Abelardo Levaggi, Constitucionalismo Argentino 1810–1850, IUSHISTORIA No. 2, 
Oct. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.salvador.edu.ar/juri/reih/2da/I04.pdf. 
 14. CONST. ARG. pmbl. 
 15. CONST. ARG. § 19. 
 16. JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, BASES Y PUNTOS DE PARTIDA PARA LA ORGANIZACIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA [BASES AND STARTING POINTS FOR THE POLITICAL 
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC] (1852), cited in ALFONSO SANTIAGO, 
RELIGIÓN Y POLÍTICA, SUS RELACIONES CON EL ACTUAL MAGISTERIO DE LA IGLESIA 
CATÓLICA Y A TRAVÉS DE LA HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINA 240 (Ad-Hoc 2007). 
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law] world view.”17 Stated another way, the invocation to God serves 
as “an express acknowledgement of a system of justice that is greater 
than this document itself and which forms the basis for all of the 
positive law in our country.”18 In Santiago’s view, the “theistic 
adherence of the constitution demonstrates also that the Argentine 
State is not, nor can be, a totalitarian State that does not recognize 
the limits of its actions.”19 Similarly, the Argentine Episcopal 
Conference expressed the following: 
The explicit reference to God reaffirms our most honored roots 
and gives a sense of our Nation’s “self,” which is born and 
developed in the faith of the majority. The diverse races and 
cultures that make up Argentina find their unity in the faith in a 
Supreme Being. Our regime is theistic, not atheist, nor neutral. 
Even for the Argentine who does not have faith, religion must be 
valued as a part of the culture that makes up our Nation.20 
At the same time, in addition to giving special status to the 
Catholic Church, to which we will later refer,21 the Constitution also 
sets forth the right of every inhabitant, citizen, or foreigner to 
“profess freely their religion.”22 
This religious tradition continued as the Constitution underwent 
its most extensive and important reform in 1994. Among other 
things, the 1994 reform reinforced the Constitution’s guarantee to 
all to “profess freely their religion” by conferring constitutional 
hierarchy “in the full force of their provisions” to relevant human 
rights conventions and declarations that govern religious freedom, 
expounding upon and clarifying their contents.23 The Constitution 
has always mandated that the national government sustain the 
Catholic Church.24 It has also always guaranteed religious freedom.25 
 
         17.  Id. 
         18.  Id. 
 19. SANTIAGO, supra note 16, at 240. 
 20. Aporte de la Conferencia Episcopal Argentina para la Reforma de la Constitución 
Nacional, Mar. 9, 1994, as quoted in 1 ANUARIO ARGENTINO DE DERECHO CANÓNICO § 3, 
at 2 (1994). 
 21. See infra this Part. 
 22. CONST. ARG. §§ 14, 20.  
 23. Id. § 22 
 24. Id. § 2 (“The Federal Government sustains the Roman Catholic Apostolic 
religion.”). 
 25. Id. at §§ 14 (“All the inhabitants of the Nation are entitled to the following rights . 
. . to profess freely their religion.”), 20 (“Foreigners enjoy within the Territory of the Nation 
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These sections are not contradictory because the Government can 
sustain a church without denying others their religious freedoms. 
The 1853 Constitution guaranteed religious freedom even as it 
granted special status to the Catholic Church.26 Thus, from the very 
beginning, while the Constitution granted to every inhabitant, 
citizen, or foreigner the right to “profess freely their religion,”27 it 
also stated that “[t]he Federal Government supports the Roman 
Catholic Apostolic religion.”28 
The question of religion occupied a distinguished place in the 
debates prior to ratification of the Constitution of 1853.29 Even 
though the delegates to the Constitutional Assembly said they were 
“Christians and Democrats” (including some who were Catholic 
priests), they still held diverse opinions concerning the position that 
the Catholic Church should hold and whether they should recognize 
religious freedom.30 
At that time, the Catholic religion was professed by almost the 
entire population. Declaring Catholicism as the “official” religion 
would have thus been a natural choice. However, one of the primary 
objectives of the Assembly was to create an Argentina that was open 
to immigration,31 which was needed to populate and develop the 
nation, and that objective necessitated a guarantee of religious 
freedom. Juan Bautista Alberdi considered it to be essential that 
European and North American immigrants come to the country, and 
many of these were not Catholic. In his work Bases, Alberdi 
expressed: 
The dilemma is fatal: we can be exclusively Catholic, or we can be 
populated and prosper and be tolerant in matters of religion. To 
call [to Argentina] the Anglo Saxon race and other populations 
 
all the Civil Rights of citizens; they may . . . practice freely their religion.”), 28 (“The 
principles, guarantees[,] and rights recognized in the preceding sections shall not be modified 
by the laws that regulate their enforcement.”).  
 26. The 1994 amendments did not alter the 1853 text regarding the three sections cited 
in the previous note.  
 27. CONST. ARG. § 14; see also id. § 20 (“practice freely their religion”). 
 28. Id. § 2. 
 29. A summary of the debate in the Constitutional Assembly of 1853 can be found in 
Norberto Padilla, Ciento Cincuenta Años Después, in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN LA 
ARGENTINA; APORTES PARA UNA LEGISLACIÓN 31–46 (CALIR-KAS 2003), available at 
http://www.calir.org.ar/libro/04.pdf, and in SANTIAGO, supra note 16, at 236. 
 30. Id.  
 31. See CONST. ARG. § 25. 
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from Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, and then deny them the 
exercise of their religion is the same as only inviting them on 
ceremony, through the hypocrisy of liberalism. This is true to the 
letter. To exclude those differing religions from South America is 
to exclude the English, Germans, Swiss, and North Americans who 
are not Catholic; that is, we would be excluding those settlers that 
this continent needs most. To bring them here without their 
religion is to bring them here without the agent that makes them 
who they are; to make them live without religion; to make them 
atheist.32  
Due in large part to Alberdi’s arguments, a compromise was 
made, which created a synthesis that guaranteed religious freedom to 
all33 and granted the Catholic Church special status or supremacy.34 
It should be noted, however, that the Church’s position of privilege 
was limited by the constitutional establishment of the Patronato, 
which subjected the Catholic Church to the civil powers in matters 
such as the designation of authorities, communication between the 
hierarchy and the faithful, etc.35 The delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention understood the Patronato as a legacy of the Spanish 
kings, and they judged it appropriate for their national sovereignty. 
In 1871, José Manuel Estrada, an opponent of the Patronato and 
advocate of the rights of the Church, argued that the religious 
freedom of the 1853 Constitution was “contradictory” since it was 
full and unlimited for all religions except Catholicism, for which it 
was null.36 He added that the Patronato “limits religious freedom, 
attacks its principle and annuls it, and the extension of all of this was 
 
 32. ALBERDI, supra note 16, at 74, cited in Horacio R. Bermudez, La Libertad Religiosa 
en la Constitución Nacional, in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN EL DERECHO ARGENTINO 81–82 
(Roberto Bosca & Juan G. Navarro Floria eds., 2007). 
 33. The policy on open immigration was established not only through the recognition 
of freedom of worship, but also through specific regulations that consolidated the idea. 
CONST. ARG. §§ 25, 75, ¶ 18). The Preamble itself designates the Constitution “to all men of 
the world who wish to dwell on Argentine soil.” Id. at pmbl. 
 34. Id. § 2. 
 35. Paul E. Sigmund, Religious Human Rights in Latin America, 10 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 173, 174 (1996) (explaining that under the principle of Patronato the sovereign 
maintained the authority to appoint bishops, while the Church was often given a religious and 
educational monopoly, as well as large land grants in return). 
 36. JOSÉ MANUEL ESTRADA, La Iglesia y el Estado, in LA IGLESIA Y EL ESTADO Y OTROS 
ENSAYOS POLÍTICOS Y DE CRÍTICA LITERARIA 9, at 36, 41–42 (4th ed. 1945). 
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all based on a doctrinal error: the right of the State to legislate in 
religious matters.”37 
This clause is still in effect today. In 1987, the Argentine 
Episcopal Conference proposed that the national government adopt 
the following constitutional language from the Province of Córdoba 
in order to guarantee freedom to the Catholic Church: 
The Argentine Nation, in accordance with its cultural tradition, 
recognizes and guarantees to the Apostolic Roman Catholic 
Church, the free and public exercise of its worship. The 
relationship of this Church and the Federal State is based on the 
principles of autonomy and cooperation. It also guarantees free and 
public exercise to other religions, with no further limitations than 
those prescribed by morals, good customs, and the public order.38 
The supremacy clause did not confer upon the Catholic Church 
the characteristics of an official State religion. This fact was 
emphasized in the 1994 reforms which, for example, removed the 
requirements that the president and vice president be Catholic and 
that they swear to the Gospel Saints,39 or that they uphold the 
obligation mandated by the National Congress to “keep peace with 
the Indians, and convert them to Catholicism.”40 In the Villacampa 
verdict of 1989, the National Supreme Court of Justice expressed 
that:  
Articles 2 [and] 67[,] paragraphs 15, 76[,] and 80, of the National 
Constitution relate intimately to legislative customs and traditions 
of the Argentine people, and also, were a consequence of the rights 
that the State exercised through the Patronato, but they do not 
mean, however, that the apostolic Roman Catholic religion should 
disguise the character of official religion of the State nor that its 
religious guidelines should be consecrated in our statutory law.41 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. 1 AADC, APORTE DE LA CONFERENCIA EPISCOPAL ARGENTINA PARA LA REFORMA 
DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL 260 (1994). 
 39. CONST. ARG. § 93 (“On assuming office, the President and Vice-President shall take 
oath before the President of the Senate and before Congress assembled, respecting their 
religious beliefs, to: ‘perform with loyalty and patriotism the office of President (or Vice-
President) of the Nation, and to faithfully observe the Constitution of the Argentine Nation, 
and to cause it to be observed.’”). 
 40. Id. § 67, ¶ 15 (1853), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/ 
Argentina/arg1853.html#seccionprimeracap3.  
 41. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 9/2/1989, “Villacampa, Ignacio v. Almos de 
Villacampa, María Angélica,” Fallos (1989-312-122) (Arg.). 
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Regarding the reference to the “conversion of the Indians to 
Catholicism,” the Court used similar language to conclude that “it 
was done in order to ensure an adequate integration of these racial 
groups into a mostly-Catholic society.”42 The Catholic Church, in 
the Report, requested the suppression of section 67, paragraph 15, 
due to its being offensive “to the indigenous people, to the Catholic 
Church, and also to the National Congress.”43 
One of the most important reforms in the 1994 constitution was 
the elevation of certain international law documents, incorporating 
them into the constitution itself, and consequently granting them 
authority equal to the constitution.44 The reform of 1994 reinforced 
the guarantee of religious freedom by conferring constitutional 
hierarchy “in the full force of their provisions” to key human rights 
conventions and declarations that govern religious freedom, 
expounding upon and clarifying their contents.45 Article 75, Item 22, 
incorporates these international agreements into the Constitution, 
and specifically states they are to be understood as complementing 
the rights and guarantees to freely profess religion as recognized in 
the first part of the founding Constitution and still found in Article 
1.46 The 1994 amendment specifically states that the Constitution 
and any human rights documents incorporated into it are to be seen 
as supportive and explanatory of one another and not as 
contradictory.47 Among these are the following United Nations 
instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),48 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948),49 the International Convention on the Elimination 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Jason Morgan-Foster, Note, The Relationship of IMF Structural Adjustment 
Programs to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Argentine Case Revisited, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 577, 593 (2003) (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 27/12/1996, 
“Chocobar Sixto Celestial v. Caja Nacional de Provisión para el Personal del Estado y Servicios 
Públicos,” Fallos (1996-319-3241) (Arg.)). 
 48. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 49. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened 
for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
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of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965),50 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),51 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966),52 and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).53 There is also 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (1979),54 and the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1984).55 The 
reforms also allowed other international law documents to be given 
constitutional hierarchy if, after a preliminary endorsement by the 
Argentine National Congress, they are approved by both branches of 
Congress by a two-thirds vote.56 Later, in 2003, the National 
Congress exercised this power by elevating the Convention on the 
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity (1969)57 to constitutional hierarchy.58 
After incorporation into the Constitution, these instruments can only 
be denounced by the National Executive Power “after the approval 
of two-thirds of all the members of each House.”59 
On a regional level, the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man (1948),60 the American Convention on Human 
Rights—Pact of San José, Costa Rica (1969),61 and the Inter-
American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons 
 
 50. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 51. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171. 
 52. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 53. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 54. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
 55. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 56. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22; see also Morgan-Foster, supra note 47, at 592–93. 
 57. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73. 
 58. Law No. 24584, Nov. 29, 1995 [28281] B.O. 1. 
 59. CONST. ARG. § 74, ¶ 22. 
 60. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted 
by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 
doc.6 rev.1, at 17 (1992). 
 61. American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
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(1994)62 also have constitutional hierarchy.63 The Magna Carta and 
other indicated international documents make up what is commonly 
referred to as the “bloc of federal constitutionality.”64 
In his report after a visit to the country in 2001, United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief (“the Report”), 
Abdelfattah Amor, expressed his satisfaction at “Argentina’s 
accession to most of the international human rights instruments—in 
fact all the instruments relating to freedom of religion and belief—
and the fact that it has incorporated them into the Constitution, 
with the status that entails.”65 
The reforms of 1994 also granted precedence over common laws 
to those treaties that don’t enjoy constitutional hierarchy.66 This 
means that while treaties not incorporated into the Constitution may 
be superseded by the Constitution, absent a constitutional 
provision—or positive law from Congress—the unincorporated 
treaties are binding on the courts. The following are examples of 
universal and regional instruments that have been ratified by 
Argentina and supersede the common law: the Geneva Conventions 
(1949),67 the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (UNESCO, 1954),68 the 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention,69 the Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention,70 the Convention 
 
 62. Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, adopted June 
9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529.  
 63. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22; Law No. 24820, May 29, 1997 [28657] B.O. 1; Law No. 
23054, Mar. 3, 1984 [25394] B.O. 1. 
 64. See F. LUCHAIRE, LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIIONNEL 179–83 (1980). 
 65. Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Religious Intolerance: Report, 
¶ 121, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/73/Add.1 (Jan. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Report]. 
 66. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22. 
 67. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, ratification by Argentina effective Mar. 18, 1957; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 
ratification by Argentina effective Mar. 18, 1957. 
 68. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, open for signature May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, accession by Argentina effective 
June 22, 1989. 
 69. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 
U.N.T.S. 291, ratification by Argentina effective Jan. 18, 1961. 
 70. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, 
June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, ratification by Argentina effective June 18, 1969. 
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against Discrimination in Education (UNESCO, 1960),71 the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961),72 the Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,73 the Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—“Protocol of San 
Salvador”74 (1988), the Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT, 1995),75 the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (1998),76 the Inter-American 
Convention against Terrorism (OAS, 2002),77 the Convention for 
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, 
2003),78 and the Protocolo Constitutivo del Parlamento del 
MERCOSUR (2005) [Protocol Establishing the Parliament of 
MERCOSUR].79 
Faced with this constitutionally designed scenario, does religious 
freedom exist and thrive when the constitutional text itself grants 
privileged status to the Catholic Church? The answer clearly is yes. 
In particular, as the United Nations Organization has stated, the 
connection of privilege between the State and a particular religion is 
not “in and of itself” contrary to human rights.80 If, however, that 
 
 71. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Nov. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93, 
ratification by Argentina effective Jan. 30, 1964. 
 72. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 
ratification by Argentina effective Oct. 10, 1963. 
 73. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 14 Nov. 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 
ratification by Argentina effective Apr. 11, 1973. 
 74. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), opened for signature Nov. 
17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, ratification by Argentina effective June 30, 2003. 
 75. Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, opened for signature 
June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322, ratification by Argentina Feb. 1, 2002. 
 76. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90, ratification by Argentina effective Feb. 8, 2001. 
 77. Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, June 3, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 19, 
ratification by Argentina July 18, 2005. 
 78. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 
2003, UNESCO Doc. MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14, ratification by Argentina effective Nov. 9, 
2006. 
 79. PROTOCOLO CONSTITUTIVO DEL PARLAMENTO DEL MERCOSUR, available at 
http://www.mercosursocialsolidario.org/images/stories/oficial/documentos/protocolo_con
stitutivo_mercosur.pdf. 
 80. Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 22 (48) (art. 18), U.N. GAOR, 
48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 209, 210, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (Oct. 7, 1993) (“The fact that a 
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particular religion were to exploit its privileged status to impinge 
upon the rights of other religious communities or to discriminate 
against those of another faith, such conduct would be inimical to 
human rights. 
In Argentina this has not happened. Non-Catholic religions in 
Argentina have been able to develop without problems—other than 
what is required in order to justify their legal status, as discussed 
below—and Argentineans can freely profess their religious beliefs. 
Moreover, the reform of 1994 abolished several religious restrictions, 
including the requirement that the president of Argentina be 
Catholic.81 
What all of this means is that, with only a few small exceptions, 
Argentina has countenanced no major religious conflicts or 
discrimination in more than 150 years of nationhood, including 
prejudice of the Catholic Church. Indeed, the special status given to 
the Catholic Church under the Constitution does not in and of itself 
create a detriment to the rights of other religions, but merely 
translates, for example, into the fact that it has public legal personnel 
recognized by the Civil Code that have made agreements with the 
State (such as the one in 1996 that stripped the Patronato of its 
power, and that of 1957, put into effect in 1992, which created the 
Military Ordinariate), and which receive direct government financial 
subsidies. These concessions themselves do not create a detriment to 
the rights of other religions since the Constitution justifiably 
regulated the form in which the “question of religion” was asked, 
based on historical foundations that justify the different treatment.82 
And so the Special Rapporteur, echoing the observations of the 
previously-mentioned Committee on Human Rights, said that 
“[f]rom the viewpoint of international law and jurisprudence in this 
 
religion is recognized as a State religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that 
its followers comprise the majority of the population shall not result in any impairment of the 
enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including articles 18 and 27, nor in any 
discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers.”). 
 81. See CONST. ARG. §§ 55, 89. 
 82. For example, the direct financing, as well as being an almost symbolic support that 
in definition complies with the constitutional mandate to “sustain the Catholic religion,” also 
recognizes historical arguments that are applicable only to the Catholic Church. CONST. ARG. 
§ 2; see Octavio Lo Prete, La Financiación Estatal de las Confesiones Religiosas [State Financing 
of Religions], in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN ESPAÑA Y ARGENTINA [Religious Freedom in 
Spain and Argentina] 271, 285 (Isidoro Martín Sánchez & Juan Navarro Floria eds., 2006).  
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field, the status of the Catholic Church as enshrined in the 
Constitution is not called into question.”83 
Notwithstanding the insubstantial subsidies provided to the 
Catholic Church, the Argentine government provides a multitude of 
benefits that apply to all religions equally. For example, tax benefits, 
which are a much more important and far-reaching mode of 
government support for religions, are equally available for all 
churches and religious communities. Moreover, other government 
subsidies—including access to the media, ability to establish schools 
or universities, permission to declare holy days, and permission to 
have a religious presence in medical centers and jails—are all freely 
available to all religions. 
Despite the government’s unflagging support, some non-
Catholic religious communities repeatedly have demanded religious 
“equality.” On this point, it seems necessary to make a distinction 
between the different facets of religious freedom. 
On an individual level, basic human dignity demands recognition 
of the rights of all people on an even footing, independent of the 
religious beliefs they hold. To that end, Argentina’s Anti-
Discrimination Law of 1988 established special legal protections 
against religiously-motivated acts of discrimination.84 Discrimination 
based on religious motivation—for example, having to belong to a 
particular religion in order to hold a public office—would not pass 
the test of reasonability demanded by the practice of jurisprudence. 
The collective or communal body of religious freedom, on the 
other hand, takes on an added dimension. Here, the principle of 
“absolute” or “arithmetic” equality clearly is incompatible with 
liberty and justice.85 This is in line with the concept of “equality” 
invariably upheld by Argentina’s National Supreme Court of Justice 
 
 83. Report, supra note 65, ¶ 153. The official followed up these comments, however, 
by saying that “a number of steps should be taken to ensure wholly equal treatment of all 
communities of religion or belief.” Id. 
 84. Law No. 23592, July 23, 1988 [26458] B.O. 1. The Special Rapporteur reported 
that “[t]he legislation which directly or indirectly governs freedom of religion or belief 
explicitly or implicitly enshrines the principles of tolerance and non-discrimination, which are 
the foundations of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.” Report, supra note 65, ¶ 124. 
 85. See Juan Navarro Floria, Los Desafíos de la Libertad Religiosa [The Challenges of 
Religious Freedom], Presentation at the International Congress “Religious Liberty: Origin of 
All Liberties” organized in Buenos Aires by CALIR (Apr. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.calir.org.ar/congreso/documentos/NAVARRO.FLORIA.pdf. 
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(which is modeled after the jurisprudence of the United States 
Supreme Court): “equal treatment to equals in equal circumstances.” 
That is, Argentina cannot exclude from one that which, in equal 
circumstances, is given to others. 
But this equality does not mean that religions cannot be 
considered differently in different situations, as long as those 
distinctions are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Indeed, different legal 
treatment is not necessarily discriminatory, nor does it violate 
constitutional rights, since factual inequalities sometimes justify 
unequal treatment. 
Of course, the Argentine government must be very careful and 
adequately substantiate different treatment given to different 
religions. Recognizing the complexity that this challenge entails, 
reasonable points should be sought out so that each religion can be 
treated according to what it represents in historical, cultural, 
sociological or analogous terms, while avoiding conceding to one 
religion that which is denied another religion in similar 
circumstances. That is, differential treatment should not be used to 
the detriment of the rights of other religious communities or used 
for legal discriminations against those who belong to a different 
religion. 
Finally, this constitutional model has allowed Argentina to be a 
model in matters of cultural integration and religious coexistence, 
and the dialogues of different religions have been ever more 
profound and productive. Argentina is an example to follow based 
on the high level of importance given to the development of peaceful 
coexistence. 
III. THE NATIONAL SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES 
Argentina is a signatory to the principle treaties on human rights 
which encompass a more extensive protection of religious freedom 
than what is established in the Argentine Constitution. It is therefore 
necessary to, even in a synthetic way, expound on how the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the hierarchal relationship between the treaties 
and State law, as well as in what way the jurisprudence of the 
enforcing bodies of the international instruments should be received, 
especially since 1994, when the most significant human rights 
treaties were given constitutional hierarchy. 
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It should be noted first that in 1992, the highest Tribunal 
determined, in the Ekmekdjian86 verdict, that these treaties prevail 
over internal law, a principle that stems from the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which established that a State party “may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure 
to perform a treaty.”87 
A. Judicial Treatment of Treaties Pursuant to the Argentine 
Constitution 
The drafters of the 1994 Constitution incorporated the Vienna 
internal law doctrine into the constitutional reforms of 1994, by 
prescribing that treaties “have a higher hierarchy than laws.”88 
Further, the Article conferred constitutional hierarchy on specific 
human rights instruments, which, in effect, created two categories of 
treaties: “ordinary” treaties, and those that receive preferential 
constitutional treatment.89 
While ordinary treaties still rank higher than the law, they are still 
subject to the Constitution. Section 27 of the Argentine National 
Constitution demands that all treaties be in accordance with the 
“principles of public law laid down by [the] Constitution.”90 In 
1993, the Supreme Court held that the Vienna Convention grants 
priority to the treaties in the case of a conflict with a contrary 
 
 86. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 07/07/1992, “Ekmekdijan, Miguel v. 
Sofovich,” Fallos (1992-315-1492) (Arg.).  
 87. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. The Convention was ratified by the Argentine Republic in 1972 and entered into force 
on January 27, 1980. Law No. 19865, Oct. 3, 1972, [XXXII-D] A.D.L.A. 6412. The 
Supreme Court expressed, in the cited verdict, that the Convention “has altered the situation 
of the Argentine legal code” in part because the application of Article 27 “imposes upon 
Argentine governmental bodies to assign priority to the treaty in the case of an eventual 
conflict with internal laws, or with the omission of dictating provisions that, in their effects, 
equate to the failure to fulfill the international treaty according to the terms of the cited Article 
27.” Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 07/07/1992, “Ekmekdijan, Miguel v. Sofovich,” 
Fallos (1992-315-1492) (Arg.). This last part implies that the verdict acknowledged operability 
to the rights encompassed in the international instruments. Ekmekdjian was also relevant 
because it advanced a criterion later developed, by establishing that the interpretation of the 
Covenant be guided by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Id.  
 88. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22.  
 89. The Argentine National Constitution refers to these treaties as having a 
“constitutional hierarchy.” Id. 
 90. CONST. ARG. § 27. 
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internal law, as long as they are in accordance with the constitutional 
“principles of public law.”91 
Certain human rights treaties are specifically mentioned in the 
seventy-fifth section of the Argentine National Constitution and 
receive a higher status in the Argentine legal hierarchy than ordinary 
law (“Section 75 treaties”).92 The language of the Constitution, 
however, has led to various interpretive difficulties, because while the 
Constitution ratified these specific treaties “in the full force of their 
provisions,” it also provides that the treaties “do not repeal any 
section of the First Part of this Constitution” and that they “are to 
be understood as complementing the rights and guarantees 
recognized [t]herein.”93 
Logically, the interaction of such precepts is decisive when trying 
to determine the scope of the treaties, and of the rights that are 
encompassed in them, so that we can definitively know (1) the 
relationship between Section 75 treaties and the Constitution itself, 
and (2) the value that should be assigned to the body of law 
stemming from the organizations and tribunals established by these 
treaties. 
1. Applying the protections of the Section 75 treaties 
Initially, we encounter the question of how to resolve possible 
conflicts of rights; that is, which has supremacy: the Section 75 
treaties or the Constitution? The majority of courts give treaties that 
have constitutional hierarchy the same deference as the Constitution. 
And while there is an influential minority view that Section 75 
 
 91. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/7/1993, “Fibraca Constructora SCA. v. 
Comisión Técnica Mixta de Salto Grande,” Fallos (1993-316-1669) (Arg.).  
 92. See CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22. The Paragraph specifically mentions the following 
treaties: “The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; the International 
Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Pact on Civil and Political 
Rights and its empowering Protocol; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide; the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women; the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments 
or Punishments; [and] the Convention of the Rights of the Child . . . .” Id. 
 93. Id. Law 24.309, which declared the need for constitutional reform, established in 
Article 7 that the Constitutional Convention could not “introduce any modification to the 
Declarations, Rights and Guarantees contained in Chapter One of the First Part of the 
National Constitution.” Law No. 24309, Dec. 29, 1993, [1994-A] A.D.L.A. at 1. 
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treaties do not receive constitutional deference, as a whole, 
Argentine law is shifting away from that approach. 
a. Minority view. Judge Belluscio, in the Petric ruling, indicated 
that the treaties mentioned in Article 75, Paragraph 22, make up 
constitutional rules of second rank; they prevail over ordinary laws, 
but are valid only to the extent in which they do not affect the rights 
enshrined in the First Part of the Constitution.94 This doctrine was 
reiterated in the Aranciba Clavel case.95 In that ruling, Judge Fayt 
alluded to the categorization of the treaties listed in Article 75, 
Paragraph 22, as “second rank,” demanding an unavoidable 
verification of their agreement with those rights and guarantees 
which the Court, in its custody and final interpretation of the 
Constitution, has the right to safeguard.96 
b. Majority view. While there have been votes for giving the 
Constitution superiority over treaties, the majority of judges have 
interpreted the formula used by the Constituent Assembly of 1994 
as a definitive judgment on the compatibility between treaties and 
the Constitution that cannot be judicially revised. Thus, it is the 
function of the Judicial Power, in every concrete case, to harmonize 
the applicable provisions of a preferential treaty with those of the 
Constitution.97 
Paragraph 22 of Section 75 states that the treaties “are to be 
understood as complementing the rights and guarantees recognized” 
by the Constitution.98 This complementary nature has been 
understood as a plus that gives the declarations an internal order, 
with either the Constitution or the treaties prevailing, depending on 
whichever gives the greatest protection.99 The Supreme Court 
reiterated this point in Monges, stipulating that “the constitutional 
 
 94. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 16/4/1998, “Petric, Domagoj Antonio c/ 
diario,” Fallos (1998-321-885) (Arg.). 
 95. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/8/2004, “Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro 
y otros,” Fallos (2004-327-3294) (Arg.). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 29/9/1998, “Cancela,” Fallos (1998-
321-2637) (Arg.); Courte Supreme de Justicia [CSJN], 27/12/1996, “Chocobar, Sixto 
Celestial v. Caja Nacional de Provisión para el Personal del Estado y Servicios Públicos,” Fallos 
(1996-319-3241) (Arg.). 
 98. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22. 
 99. Gelli, María Angélica, Constitución de la Nación Argentina, Comentada y 
Concordada [Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Commentary and Agreements], in 2 LA 
LEY 227 (4th ed. expanded 2008). 
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clauses and those of the treaties have the same hierarchy, are 
complementary, and therefore, cannot displace or destroy the 
other.”100 
Further, the constitutional phrase, “in the full force of their 
provisions” has been interpreted to mean not only the method by 
which the treaties were approved and ratified by the Republic of 
Argentina (i.e., the requirement that a treaty is not to be ratified 
with a reservation that is “incompatible with the object and purpose 
of the treaty”),101 but also the interpretive reach given to the clauses 
of the treaty by the international legal system.102 
B. Effect of Decisions by International Courts on Argentine 
Jurisprudence 
Although the courts uphold the provisions found in preferential 
treaties, there is still the question of how to treat decisions that are 
not found directly in the treaty but are made by a body created by 
the treaty; that is, if a preferential treaty either creates an 
international court or authorizes an existing international court to 
hear a relevant case, what deference, if any, do the Argentine Courts 
give to those decisions? 
Five of the ten listed Section 75 treaties explicitly authorize an 
international court to try disputes resulting from a breach of the 
applicable treaty. The American Convention on Human Rights 
created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.103 The other 
 
 100. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 26/12/1996, “Monges, Analía M. v. 
Universidad de Buenos Aires,” Fallos (1996-319-3148) (Arg.). 
 101. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (stating that a reservation may not strip a treaty of its original purpose). Argentina has 
approved, with reservations and/or declarations, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the American Convention on Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. See Law No. 6286/56, Apr. 9, 1956, [XVI-A] A.D.L.A. 273; Law No. 23054, Mar. 1, 
1984, [25394] B.O. 1; Law No. 23313, Apr. 17, 1986, [25928] B.O. 1; Law No.23849, 
Sept. 27, 1990, [26993] B.O. 1. 
 102. Gelli, supra note 99, at 221. 
 103. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 33, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123 (“The following [organizations] shall have competence with respect to matters relating to 
the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties to this Convention: . . . [t]he 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights . . . .”). 
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four pertinent treaties authorize the International Court of Justice to 
hear disputes.104 
1. Judicial decisions promulgated by international courts 
In the Giroldi ruling in 1995, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
constitutional hierarchy of the American Convention on Human 
Rights was established by the express will of the Constituent 
Assembly in the full force of its provisions; “that the Convention is 
valid in the international sphere and particularly considering its 
effective legal application by the international courts through their 
interpretation and application.”105 
When Argentina approved the American Convention on Human 
Rights (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica) in 1984, it recognized “the 
competence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and on the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights . . . for an indeterminate period and on condition of 
reciprocity on all cases related to the interpretation or application of 
 
 104. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, art. 30, ¶ 1, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Any 
dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, 
be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration 
the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties 
may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the 
Statute of the Court.”); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, art. 29, ¶ 1, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S.13 (“Any 
dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation of application of the 
present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be 
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the 
parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may 
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute 
of the Court.”); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, art. 22, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (“Any dispute 
between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this 
Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in 
this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the 
International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of 
settlement.”); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 
9, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (“Disputes between the Contracting 
Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, 
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other of 
the acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at 
the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”). 
 105. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/4/1995, “Giroldi, Horacio David y otro / 
recurso de casación,” Fallos (1995-318-514) (Arg.) (emphasis added). 
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the Convention cited.”106 The Giroldi ruling agreed with this 
interpretation pointing out that “the cited jurisprudence should 
serve as a guide for the interpretation of the convention precepts in 
the manner in which the Argentine State recognizes the competence 
of the Inter-American court in all cases relative to its interpretation 
and application of the American Convention.”107 
In Arancibia Clavel, Judge Boggiano reiterated this deferential 
doctrine by holding that the treaties “must be applied in Argentina 
just like they function in the international sphere, including the 
international jurisprudence relative to those treaties and the rules of 
customary international law as complemented by the pertinent 
international practice,” adding in his vote that the signatory 
countries, among them Argentina, “have greatly reduced the scope 
of their respective internal jurisprudence by way of agreement with 
many treaties and declarations on human rights and by participating 
in the formation of a delineated body of international customary law 
regarding human rights.”108 
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Argentina clarified the 
international doctrine: “[T]he Judiciary . . . must exercise a type of 
‘conventionality control’ between the domestic legal provisions, 
applied to specific cases, and the American Convention on Human 
Rights,” and the Court must keep in mind “not only the treaty, but 
also the interpretation of the same as made by the Inter-American 
Court, the highest interpreter of the American Convention.”109 
2. Advisory opinions issued by international administrative bodies 
While courts must give deference to applicable international 
courts, there is still the question of how to treat promulgations made 
by international administrative bodies. The Supreme Court, in their 
Bramajo ruling, stated that the advisory opinions and 
recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights must also serve as an “interpretation guide” for the precepts 
 
 106. Law No. 23054, Mar. 19, 1984, [25394] B.O. 1. 
 107. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/4/1995, “Giroldi, Horacio David y otro / 
recurso de casación,” Fallos (1995-318-514) (Arg.). 
 108. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/8/2004, “Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro 
y otros,” Fallos (2004-327-3294) (Arg.). 
 109. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 13/7/2007, “Mazzeo, Julio Lilo y otros,” 
Fallos (2007-330-3248) (Arg.). 
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of the American Convention.110 Two years later, however, the Court 
limited the reach of advisory opinions, indicating that while the State 
must make all necessary efforts to give a favorable response to the 
Commission’s recommendations, “this is not equivalent to 
establishing as a must that judges give compliance to its content by 
not dealing with decisions that are reserved for the Judiciary.”111 
In summary, the Argentine legal system is going through a 
period of redefinitions and transformations. The generally expressed 
characteristics show that the National Supreme Court of Justice has 
set out in recent years on a path towards the functionality and 
obligations of international law governing human rights, clearing up 
the interpretations made by the respective enforcing bodies, 
principally the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND CHALLENGES 
The status of religious freedom, as guaranteed by Argentine law, 
is, in general terms, highly satisfactory.112 Religions can perform their 
work without inconveniences and we see very few cases of 
discrimination based on religion. Those few cases that have surfaced 
have been isolated cases and in the majority of cases have been 
satisfactorily resolved. 
In the previously-mentioned report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur 
underlined that not only do the “federal and provincial 
constitutional provisions guarantee freedom of religion and belief 
and freedom to manifest religion or belief in accordance with 
relevant international law,” but also that, in general terms, 
“Argentine legislation furnishes solid constitutional foundations and 
important legal guidelines to guarantee freedom of religions and 
belief,” and that “the State’s policy generally embodies respect for 
freedom of religion or belief and freedom to manifest religion or 
 
 110. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 12/9/1996, “Bramajo, Hernan de Javier,” 
Fallos (1996-319-1840) (Arg.). 
 111. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 22/12/1998, “Acosta, Claudia Beatriz y otros,” 
Fallos (1998-321-3555) (Arg.). 
 112. We should remember that in 1989, the Supreme Court, in partially allowing a case 
of conscientious objection to obligatory military service, demonstrated that religious freedom is 
“particularly valuable” and that humanity has achieved it “thanks to many efforts and 
tribulations” (Consideration 8, Majority Vote). See Rulings 312:496 (Law 1989-C, 405; The 
Law 133:365). 
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belief, in keeping with international human rights standards in this 
field.”113 
Argentina has ratified the principle international instruments that 
protect and prescribe the scope of religious freedom, and has even 
given them a substantial elevation by granting them constitution 
hierarchy in the reform of 1994.114 Adding to this is the 
interpretative path which the Supreme Court has been treading, 
which has been favorable to the reception of the opinion and 
jurisprudence that the transnational courts and organizations carry 
out in the application of treaties. 
In any case, we understand that in order to further the validity of 
religious freedom, we must face the following challenges: 
Sanctioning a law that will set forth the standards of religious 
freedom in their widest interpretation possible, extended to both 
individuals and religious communities, and granting at the same time 
to non-Catholic religions a legal status more in line with their own 
uniqueness.115 
Consolidating policies in order to increase the understanding and 
importance given to religious freedom as a fundamental right, 
especially in education.116 
 
 113. See Report, supra note 65, ¶¶ 118, 128, 130. The Rapporteur added in this last 
point that, “[t]he authorities permit the practice of religion, the construction of places of 
worship, religious education and, in fact, apart from special situations and cases, the expression 
of all manifestations of freedom of religion.” He goes on to say that “the State grants public 
funds to a variety of religious communities, but the predominant Catholic Church and 
religious minorities,” and that, “[i]n general, the State does not interfere in the internal affairs 
of communities of religion and belief,” and that “[i]t is very active in dialogue and cooperation 
with religious communities.” Id. ¶ 130. 
 114. This reform also struck down the requirement that the president be Catholic, and 
eliminated all of the regulations of the Patronato (which had not been in effect since the 
Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Holy See in 1966) and gave way to the 
consolidation of the principle of non-discrimination, establishing that the swearing in of the 
president and vice-president be performed according to their own religious beliefs. CONST. 
ARG. § 93. 
 115. At the time of this writing, the Secretary of Worship is elaborating on a new draft 
legislation that will incorporate previous proposals, among them the draft bill by the Argentine 
Council on Religious Freedom (CALIR). 
 116. Take, for example, the “inter-religious pledge of allegiance to the flag” that every 
year reunites students from public schools and private schools (both religious and lay), with the 
objective of strengthening the values of peaceful coexistence. The initiative, created by the 
Institute for Inter-Religious Dialogue and the Christian Youth Association, together with the 
Secretary of Worship, is complemented by various activities held in the separate schools with 
parents, docents, and students. See Press Release, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
Comercio Internacional y Culto (Arg.), Press Release No. 225/07 (on file with author).  
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Authoring cooperative agreements between the State and various 
religious entities on matters of mutual interest. 
Protecting, including through reforms of penal legislation, 
religious feelings from offense or ridicule of sacred dogmas, things or 
places. 
Expanding the recognition of the right to conscientious 
objection, and extending its scope. 
Condemning expressions that seek to nullify the opinion of, or 
even reject the public participation of, religions in matters of 
common interest. 
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